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I. INTRODUCTION
Across the globe, the mobile communications revolution is well under
way. From advanced economies such as the United States, to developing
economies like India, mobile telecommunications, in both voice and data
forms, is quickly becoming the communications technology of choice. In
the United States, it took less than fifteen years for wireless telephones to
move from a thinly consumed service to effective ubiquity.1 In 2009, there
were 285.6 million wireless accounts in the United States, which translates
to roughly 1.1 accounts for every person over ten years of age or more.2
Mobile communications has evolved well beyond voice technology to now
include enhanced communications services such as text messages, e-mail,
and broadband connectivity, which are, in fact, quickly becoming the
dominant source of consumer value for mobile service. In the not-so-distant
future, it is expected by some that mobile appliances, like the iPhone, will
replace traditional computers for many consumers.3 For many individuals
and households, mobile broadband may be the Internet connection of
choice.4
This rise in wireless connections, as well as the rapidly increasing
demand for data services over such connections, is a mixed blessing. On
the one hand, it provides an enormous economic boon to consumers,
businesses, and providers; on the other hand, however, it is beginning to
test the capacity of networks to provide such services. As a result, the
supply of available quality commercial spectrum is rapidly becoming

1. See CTIA, Background on CTIA’s Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, at 3–4
(2011), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_Year_End_2010_Graphics.pdf (showing 33.7
million accounts in 1995 (0.13 per capita) and 292.8 million in 2010 (0.95 per capita)).
CENSUS
BUREAU,
2. Id.;
Population
Estimates,
U.S.
http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2009-sa.html (268.5 million persons
ten years and over).
3. See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, Time to Leave the Laptop Behind, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
2009, at R1; Geoff Kirbyson, More of Us Cutting the Cord: Wireless Generation
Unplugging Their Computers, Phones, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Aug. 20, 2010, at A2; Bill
Ray, Cutting the Cord: Future Mobile Broadband Tech, REGISTER HARDWARE (July 14,
2009), http://www.reghardware.com/2009/07/14/future_wireless_tech/.
4. See, e.g., Wingfield, supra note 3.
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exhausted.5
Fortunately, this fact has not gone unrecognized by policymakers.
FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski recently observed that “America is
facing a looming spectrum crunch”6 because “the United States does not
have nearly enough spectrum to meet its medium- and long-term mobile
broadband needs.”7 Perhaps the single most important proposal in the
National Broadband Plan is to make 500 megahertz (MHz) of additional
spectrum available by 2020 for the provision of mobile broadband services,
with ideally 300 MHz of that spectrum being made available by 2015,8 a
vision that President Obama formally endorsed by Presidential
Memorandum.9
Allocating more spectrum to advanced mobile services (such as
broadband) is widely viewed as a sensible, if not a necessary, public
policy.10 However, merely stating that more spectrum is to be allocated to
commercial mobile services leaves some highly relevant details unresolved.
There are (at least) two important questions that must be answered when
increasing the supply of spectrum: (1) how much new spectrum is to be
allocated; and, more importantly, (2) who gets it?11 On the first question, as
5. Within limits, the capacity of fixed amount of spectrum can also be enhanced by
increasing the number of towers. FCC, NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 77 (2010),
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf (describing the capacity
limitation of mobile broadband network); FCC, THE BROADBAND AVAILABILITY GAP 71
(2010), http://download.broadband.gov/plan/the-broadband-availability-gap-obi-technicalpaper-no-1.pdf (“Loosely speaking, if spectral efficiency of the air interface remains
unchanged, capacity of the wireless network grows proportionately with spectrum
allocation.”); see also FCC, MOBILE BROADBAND: THE BENEFITS OF ADDITIONAL SPECTRUM
(2010),
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc-staff-technical-paper-mobile-broadbandbenefits-of-additional-spectrum.pdf.
6. Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Mobile Broadband: A 21st Century Plan for
the U.S. Competitiveness, Innovation and Job Creation, Prepared Remarks at the New
America
Foundation
(Feb.
24,
2010),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296490A1.pdf.
7. Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Broadband: Our Enduring Engine for
Prosperity and Opportunity, Prepared Remarks at the NARUC Conference, Washington,
D.C.
(Feb.
16,
2010),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC296262A1.pdf.
8. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 10.
9. See Lawrence H. Summers, Dir., Nat’l Econ. Council, Technological Opportunities,
Job Creation, and Economic Growth, Remarks at the New America Foundation on the
President’s
Spectrum
Initiative
(June
28,
2010),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/speeches/technological-opportunitiesjob-creation-economic-growth.
10. See id.; NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at ch. 5; Genachowski, supra
note 6.
11. There are, of course, many more important questions, such as how large are the
blocks, are they licensed or unlicensed, are they auctioned, what is the geographic scope of
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noted a moment ago, the FCC has proposed to increase substantially the
spectrum available for mobile services. On the other hand, the FCC has
sent clear signals that it is concerned with increasing industry concentration
(despite the fact that it approved every auction and wireless merger to date)
and, by implication, that it would prefer to allocate any new spectrum
primarily to new entrants and possibly smaller incumbents, rather than the
largest incumbent providers, in order to “deconcentrate” the industry.12
The allocation of spectrum among firms is a complex issue for which
economic theory can provide key insights. To this end, we provide in this
Article a theoretical analysis of some of the relevant tradeoffs involved in
allocating spectrum among service providers. Informally, our analysis
contemplates two (theoretical) states of the world. In the first, a fixed
amount of spectrum is divided among many firms so that each firm has a
“little” spectrum. In the other, that same fixed amount of spectrum is
divided among fewer firms, so that each firm has “much” spectrum.
Incorporating the modeling assumption that a firm with a larger holding of
spectrum can provide more advanced services due to greater capacity and
throughput than a firm with less spectrum,13 the theoretical tradeoff, all
other things constant, is straightforward. In a setting with “many firms with
little spectrum,” there may be more price competition, but that competition
takes place over relatively less advanced services.14 In a setting with fewer
firms with larger allotments of spectrum, there may be less price
competition (due to the Cournot assumption), but that competition occurs
over more advanced services (due to the relationship between spectrum and
the capacity to offer such services). Lower prices are good, and higher
quality is good, but, if quality requires large amounts of a fixed allotment
of spectrum, then the two may not occur together (as a result of the
the license, and so forth.
12. See infra Part II. The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of industry concentration falls as
market share shifts from larger to smaller firms.
13. The form of the holdings is a significant factor. For example, having spectrum in
paired bands permits greater bandwidth. See, e.g., BROADBAND AVAILABILITY GAP, supra
note 5, at 73. On the tradeoff between expanding capacity using more spectrum or deploying
more network, see, for example, MOBILE BROADBAND: THE BENEFITS OF ADDITIONAL
SPECTRUM, supra note 5.
14. In the Cournot setting, firms choose the quantities they will offer to the market, and
then the market price is determined by the market that liquidates those quantities. (Such a
setting is akin to firms that set sales targets.) With Cournot competition, price and profits
fall as the number of firms increases, converging on the competitive equilibrium. This
“more firms, lower price” mentality dominates regulatory debates, and it is reasonable to
say that Cournot competition is the benchmark in regulatory settings. See STEPHEN MARTIN,
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 17–35 (1993); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M.
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 157–87 (2000).

Number 3]

SPECTRUM ALLOCATION

643

modeling assumptions). Consequently, the policymaker is asked to trade
off between potentially lower prices for less advanced services, and
potentially higher prices for more advanced services. It is not apparent, at
first glance, which situation is “better.”
Since, however, either of the above-described outcomes can be
supported as “best” under certain conditions, linking the theory to the
current structure of the mobile telecommunications industry is required in
order to render policy-relevant conclusions. We believe this linkage,
properly understood, can render fairly strong prescriptions. First, while
additional firms can lead to lower prices (at least in the Cournot
competition framework, which is the standard for regulatory policy), at
some point additional firms have almost no effect on price. In fact,
economic theory suggests that the price cuts resulting from additional firms
rapidly diminish, and there is evidence to support this theoretical result.15
Price cuts are mostly exhausted after about three to five rivals are present in
the market.16 From an empirical standpoint, FCC data indicate that at
present about ninety-one percent of the population has access to four or
more mobile providers.17 Consequently, adding new competitors to the
mobile industry is expected to have a small impact on prices. The gains
from dividing spectrum into smaller parts in an effort to create more firms
(e.g., using spectrum caps) are therefore likely to be very low, even under
favorable conditions.18 Alternately, the economic gains from having access
to broadband services are typically viewed as being very large, so a policy

15. See, e.g., Roger L. Beck & Sheila Mozejko, Concentration and Price/Cost Margins
Across Time in Canada, 9 CANADIAN J. ADMIN. SCI. 40, 40 (1992); Stephen A. Rhoades,
Market Share as a Source of Market Power: Implications and Some Evidence, 37 J. ECON.
& BUS. 343, 343 (1985); Michael Salinger, The Concentration-Margins Relationship
Reconsidered in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS 287 (1990);
John R. Schroeter, Estimating the Degree of Market Power in the Beef Packing Industry, 70
REV. ECON. & STAT. 158, 158 (1988); Myron B. Slovin et al., Deregulation, Contestability,
and Airline Acquisitions, 30 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 231 (1991); Gary Whalen, The Determinants
and Performance Effects of Rivalry in Local Banking Markets, 31 Q. J. BUS. & ECON. 38, 38
(1992).
16. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 14, at 165. (“The effect of additional rivals on
quantity and price is initially very strong, but tapers off as the number of firms increases.”).
17. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Fourteenth Report, 25 F.C.C.R. 11407, para. 44 (2010) [hereinafter Fourteenth CMRS
Report].
18. The Merger Guidelines, for example, recommend ignoring mergers where the HHI
is 1800 or less, which is equivalent to five equal-sized firms. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE &
FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997) [hereinafter 1997
HORIZONTAL
MERGER
GUIDELINES],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm. Thus, the fifth firm is viewed as
trivial in terms of its effect on equilibrium prices.
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of granting existing firms (which can maximize spillovers from their
existing plant and customer relationships) sufficient spectrum to run
scalable networks that support innovation in both applications and devices
is likely to produce substantial economic benefits. Therefore, in effect we
have a situation where price changes are no longer a part of the calculus,
since adding firms is expected to have a small effect on price competition.
As such, the tradeoff revealed by the theory is simply between less- or
more-advanced services, and the best policy is clear.
In large part, our analysis comports with the recommendations of the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), which address not simply the issue of
how much spectrum should be allocated to the industry, but the importance
of how much spectrum is given to a single firm. In a letter to the FCC, the
DOJ observes, “[s]tated simply, without access to sufficient spectrum a
firm cannot provide state-of-the-art wireless broadband services.”19 The
DOJ also addresses, to some extent, the details of allocation decisions,
observing, “[t]he goal in assigning licenses to any such new spectrum
designated for commercial services should be to ensure that it generates the
greatest ultimate benefits to the consumers of those services.”20 Our
economic model adopts this “greatest ultimate benefits” approach, which is
standard economic fare.
Another important insight from the theory is that policymakers do not
get to choose the number of firms offering mobile telecommunications
services simply through the government’s spectrum allocation decisions.
Stated another way, the conventional wisdom that “more” spectrum
somehow a fortiori means “more” firms simply is not true.21 As explained
19. Notice of Ex Parte Submission of the United States Department of Justice at 22,
Economic Issues in Broadband Competition; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future,
FCC
GN
Docket
No.
09-51
(rel.
Jan.
4,
2010),
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020355122.
20. Id. at 23.
21. Cf. Mignon Clyburn, Comm’r, FCC, Introduction to the Panel “Wireless Spectrum
Needs: What Is the Best Way to Serve All of the American People?,” Prepared Remarks at
the Rainbow Push Coalition 39th Annual Convention, Chicago, Illinois 3 (June 14, 2010),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-298781A1.pdf
(“[A]dditional
spectrum could foster more competition in the wireless space, which in turn could yield
more affordable prices.”); Gregory L. Rosston, Deputy Dir. & Senior Research Scholar,
Stanford Inst. for Economic Policy, Research Deputy Dir., Public Policy Program Stanford
University, FCC En Banc Hearing on Broadband Network Management Practices, Stanford
University 7 (Apr. 17, 2008) (“Obviously, it would be great if it were economic for multiple
firms to string fiber optic cable around all neighborhoods in the United States. That is
unlikely to happen. But the FCC has tools to make facilities-based competition more likely
and more viable. First and foremost, the FCC should get even more spectrum out into the
marketplace. And it is probably important that the spectrum not continue to go into the
hands of the two incumbent landline telephone companies that also have by far the most
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in Competition After Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure and
Convergence,22 which was cited at length by the FCC in the Fourteenth
CMRS Report, it is the supply- and demand-side economic conditions of
the marketplace that determine the equilibrium number of firms.23
Economics determines the viable number of providers, not the intentions of
policymakers.24 Mobile services cannot be supplied without spectrum, but
having spectrum does not imply financial success. Spectrum is simply one
input to production and cannot singularly determine the financial viability
of firms offering mobile communications services. This is apparent from
the history of the mobile industry, which has undergone consolidation over
much of its history (and may be due for more).25 This consolidation is
merely the industry adjusting towards a sustainable structure—an
equilibrium consisting of fewer firms than that licensed by the design of the
early FCC spectrum allocation decisions. The reality is that, while we may
want five, ten, or twenty mobile telephony service providers, the economics
are unlikely to permit it.26 Consequently, the heavy use of incumbentexclusion policies (such as spectrum caps or other limitations on spectrum
use by firms) may not result in more providers, but may instead lead simply
to inefficient use of scarce spectrum resources.27
valuable wireless spectrum.”).
22. George S. Ford et al., Competition After Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure, and
Convergence, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 331 (2007).
23. Id.; see Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at paras. 56–57; see also
NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 36–37; Implementation of Section 19 of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, First Report, 9
F.C.C.R. 7442, app. H (1994) (discussing how the presence of high sunk costs may have a
decisive effect on the evolution of local market structure and the possible trade-offs between
the number of actual competitors in any local cable market and the intensity of price
competition that might prevail) [hereinafter First Report].
24. See Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22, at 341–44 (explaining that the
equilibrium number of firms is expressed as a function of market size in expenditures, the
intensity of competition, and the sunk cost of entry).
25. Marguerite Reardon, Sprint CEO Sees ‘Logic’ in Merger with T-Mobile, CNET
NEWS (July 13, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-20010427-266.html; Andrew
Parker & Paul Taylor, Sprint’s 4G Move Opens Way to Merger, FT.COM (July 12, 2010),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4d6eb6a-8de0-11df-9153-00144feab49a.html.
26. See Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at para. 61 n.141 (citing An
Examination of Competition in the Wireless Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th
Cong. 5 (2009) (written statement of George S. Ford, Chief Economist, Phoenix Center for
Advanced Legal & Economic Public Studies)).
27. Cf. Clyburn, supra note 21, at 5 (“As we roll out more spectrum to auction across
the board, what role will minority businesses play? I recently expressed my dismay over
conflicting signals that are given out by the FCC and DOJ as to what kinds of bidders the
federal government is seeking when it comes to conditions on spectrum reallocation. The
concern is what happens to the spectrum that is being auctioned. Are we going to continue
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Finally, we present empirical evidence shedding light on the
relationship between industry concentration and the amount of spectrum
licensed for commercial services. While many believe and claim that more
spectrum will necessarily lead to more competitors, this causal linkage has
no basis in either theory (as just discussed) or empirics. While the PCS
auctions in the mid-1990s broke the then (government-created) duopolistic
market, over the past decade the amount of spectrum allocated to
commercial services has risen substantially; at the same time, however,
industry concentration has risen slightly as mobile communications
advances toward an equilibrium market structure.28 Recent data show that
more spectrum does not generally lead to lower industry concentration (see
figure 4 infra). In many respects, this finding should not be a surprise. As
services advance, so do the sunk costs of building and maintaining the
networks and, equally important, the costs of building and maintaining a
customer base. In turn, equilibrium industry concentration rises. This
consequence of quality competition is explained theoretically in John
Sutton’s text, Sunk Costs and Market Structure, and the logic of these
“endogenous” sunk costs is embedded in recent FCC analysis.29
Fortunately, research shows that higher concentration arising from the
endogenous sunk costs resulting from quality competition can have positive
welfare consequences.30 The data also show that rising concentration has
not been accompanied by rising prices (see figure 4 infra).31 Average
revenue per minute has fallen significantly and persistently over the past
fifteen years, suggesting that market structure may not be a meaningful
driver of price competition at historically relevant levels of industry
concentration.32
The paper is organized as follows. In Part II, we provide an overview
of the FCC’s treatment of concentration in the wireless industry—from the
imposition of spectrum caps in the mid 1990s, to the abolition of these
to see spectrum go to the largest providers? Or are there meaningful opportunities to be had
for small and underrepresented businesses in this high-growth field? This aspect of the
spectrum conversation cannot be ignored.”).
28. See generally Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22 (describing equilibrium
industry structure in plain language).
29. JOHN SUTTON, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE (1991); NATIONAL
BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 62 n.2 (“The key insight is that in such industries the
total number of firms is likely to be limited and may even shrink as the market grows.”).
30. See George S. Ford & Michael Stern, Endogenous Sunk Costs, Quality Competition
and Welfare: A Technical Note, PHOENIX CENTER PERSPECTIVES, Dec. 16, 2010,
http://www.phoenix-center.org/perspectives/Perspective10-07Final.pdf.
31. See Fourteenth CRMS Report, supra note 17, at paras. 52, 186, 190 (considering
Table 8 on industry concentration and Tables 18 and 19 on prices).
32. See infra Figure 1.
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spectrum caps in 2001, to the re-imposition of de facto spectrum caps in the
Harbinger merger review proceeding.33 In Part III, we set forth an
analytical framework to evaluate the important policy questions posited
above. In Part IV, we deal specifically with the commonly held belief that
“more spectrum” a fortiori means “more” firms. Concluding thoughts and
policy recommendations are set forth in Part V.

II. FROM DE JURE TO DE FACTO SPECTRUM CAPS
Implications of industry concentration have always been a difficult
issue for the FCC. The potential for concentration in the wireless sector is
especially acute due to “the barrier to entry posed by the limited
availability of spectrum.”34 As the FCC observed ten years ago in the 2000
Biennial Review:
The requirement to obtain access to spectrum constitutes a barrier to
facilities-based entry into the CMRS marketplace because the supply
of suitable spectrum is limited. Facilities-based mobile telephony
service cannot be offered without access to suitable spectrum, and a
government license is required to use spectrum to provide CMRS.35

The FCC’s first attempt at dealing with industry concentration was the
imposition of spectrum caps in anticipation of the auction of PCS spectrum
in 1994.36 At the time, there were two firms offering mobile telephone
services in each market, one of which was the incumbent wireline provider.
The FCC essentially proffered two explanations for its decision. First, it
was concerned that if licensees were able “to aggregate sufficient amounts
of CMRS spectrum, then it would be possible for them, unilaterally or in
combination, to exclude efficient competitors, to reduce the quantity or
quality of services provided, or to increase prices to the detriment of
consumers.”37 Second, the FCC reasoned that a spectrum cap would
“prevent licensees from artificially withholding [(i.e., “warehousing”)]
capacity from the marketplace.”38
33. The purpose of a spectrum cap is to place an upper bound on the amount of
spectrum available to mobile carriers, a rule that historically has been binding only for the
larger carriers. The Harbinger rules restrict access by the largest wireless carriers to
spectrum capacity in the secondary market, thereby operating in a similar capacity as a de
jure spectrum cap.
34. 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits for Commercial
Mobile Radio Services, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 22668, para. 39 (2001) [hereinafter
2000 Biennial Review].
35. Id. at para. 40.
36. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Third
Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 7988 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 CMRS Spectrum Cap Order].
37. 2000 Biennial Review, supra note 34, at para. 12.
38. Id.
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Seven years later, the wireless telephone market had undergone a
competitive transformation as the PCS spectrum permitted additional entry.
At the end of 2000, the FCC found that “about ninety-one percent of U.S.
residents lived in a county that was served, at least in part, by three or more
different . . . providers, and seventy-five percent of the U.S. population
lived in a county where five or more providers offered service.”39
Moreover, the FCC found that market concentration, as measured by
subscriber share, was falling.40 On the other hand, it found that when it
used spectrum share as the capacity measure, the Hirschman-Herfindahl
Index (HHI) revealed “moderate” to “high” concentration.41
Both supply-side and demand-side conditions in the mobile sector,
including scale economies, tend to favor larger firms and thus promote
relatively concentrated market outcomes. Building, maintaining, and
operating a mobile communications business requires significant capital
expenditures on both network infrastructure and customer relationships.
Industry concentration, as measured by indexes such as the HHI, is likely
to be relatively high for the foreseeable future (greater than, say, the
thresholds commonly used in the Merger Guidelines for defining
concentrated markets).42 But high concentration does not imply poor
performance, and this point was not lost on the FCC. It reasoned that
“caution is appropriate in employing such measures” as the HHI because
[a]lthough more concentrated markets can be less competitive and
more vulnerable to anticompetitive activity than less concentrated
markets, moderate to high concentration is not necessarily a threat to
competition. For example, we have previously found that “an HHI
analysis alone is not determinative and does not substitute for our more
detailed examination of competitive considerations.” In the case of
CMRS markets, for example, limits to economies of scale,
technological compatibility issues, difficulties in finding a willing
seller at a reasonable price, and capital market constraints limit
39. Id. at para. 31.
40. Id. at para. 32.
41. Id. at para. 33. The HHI is an accepted measure of market concentration but has
limitations in dynamic markets. The index is calculated by summing the squared market
shares of each firm. For example, a market consisting of three equally sized firms has an
HHI of 3,333 (= 1/3 = 33.3332 + 33.3332 + 33.3332). The number’s equivalent is simply
[1/(HHI/1000)], where this ratio measures the number of hypothetical, equally sized firms in
a market (irrespective of the actual distribution of market shares.
42. 1997 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 18. The 1997 Merger
Guidelines define as “highly concentrated” those markets with a HHI exceeding 1,800. In
the proposed 2010 revisions to the Merger Guidelines, however, a “highly concentrated”
market is one with an HHI exceeding 2,500. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
MERGER
GUIDELINES
(proposed
Apr.
20,
2010),
HORIZONTAL
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/04/100420hmg.pdf.
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consolidation.43

Here, the FCC rejected an exclusive reliance on HHIs and instead pointed
to its then-recent Sixth CMRS Report,44 which found that the wireless
market was performing well. Not only was subscribership up, but also
wireless prices were on the decline.45 Moreover, the FCC found that there
were six nationwide wireless operators (AT&T, Cingular, Nextel, Sprint,
Verizon, and VoiceStream) from which consumers could choose.46 Finally,
the FCC found that “the need for direct access to spectrum is not absolute
because carriers can compete in the provision of CMRS without direct
access to spectrum through resale, or a mobile virtual network operator
(‘MVNO’) arrangement.”47
Given the above, the FCC held that it was persuaded that competition
was robust enough in CMRS markets that it was no longer appropriate to
impose overbroad, a priori limits on spectrum aggregation that may
prevent transactions that are in the public interest. As such, as part of the
FCC’s mandatory 2000 Biennial Review, the Commission eliminated the
spectrum cap regime in favor of a more nuanced, case-by-case approach,
accompanied by enforcement sanctions in case of misconduct. In so doing,
the FCC reasoned that it now had the necessary “flexibility to reach the
appropriate decision in each case, on the basis of the particular
circumstances of that case.”48
In the ten years that have followed the FCC’s removal of its original
price caps, it has made new spectrum available to the market, most notably
the 700 MHz and AWS spectrum made available from the DTV transition.
At the same time, the FCC also approved several mergers and
combinations of mobile licensees, thereby reducing the number of
nationwide mobile carriers from six in 2000 to four in 2010.49 In its
Fourteenth CMRS Report, the FCC found, by its own calculations, that
between 2003 and 2008, average HHI had increased from 2151 to 2848—a

43. 2000 Biennial Review, supra note 34, at para. 33 (citation omitted) (citing
WorldCom, Inc. & MCI Comm. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R.
18025, 18084 (1998)). Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit recognized, “[r]eliance on statistical
market share in cases involving regulated industries is at best a tricky enterprise and is
downright folly where . . . the predominant market share is the result of regulation.” Metro
Mobile CTS, Inc. v. NewVector Comm. Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir. 1989).
44. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Sixth Report, 16 F.C.C.R. 13350 (2001) [hereinafter Sixth CMRS Report].
45. 2000 Biennial Review, supra note 34, at para. 35.
46. Id. at para. 38.
47. Id. at para. 42 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at para. 50.
49. Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at paras. 75–84.
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rise of 697 points.50 Again, the FCC remarked that “market concentration,
by itself, is an imperfect indicator of market power,” and deliberately
reached no conclusions on market power.51
The evidence speaks for itself, however. By the FCC’s own account,
the wireless market in the United States continues to perform exceptionally
well. According to the Fourteenth CMRS Report, mobile subscribership
was up,52 and consumers were benefitting from aggressive price
competition in both the prepaid and postpaid markets from a variety of
pricing plans.53 Indeed, average revenues per voice minute continued to
hover around $0.05,54 and average revenue per text message was only
around $0.011.55 Equally important, the FCC found that consumers
benefited from the intense nonprice rivalry among carriers, including “1)
network upgrades; 2) product information and perception, which include
advertising and marketing; and 3) downstream product differentiation,
which includes handset/device and application offerings.”56 According to
the FCC’s analysis, therefore, the higher concentration naturally resulting
from mergers in the mobile sector has not diminished market
performance.57
50. Id. at para. 51. Significantly, unlike the analysis to support its decision to remove
spectrum caps, the FCC in the Fourteenth CMRS Report specifically refused to count
MVNOs as a competitor in the mobile wireless market in its analysis of market structure.
See id. at para. 32 (“MVNOs are not counted as separate competitors from their hosting
facilities-based providers in our analysis of market structure.”). The Fourteenth CMRS
Report also reports an HHI of 2220, which is computed by the investment firm Merrill
Lynch. See id. at Table 41.
51. Id. at para. 55 (This was “due to the complexities of estimating market power in an
industry with high fixed costs that are recovered gradually over time, difficulties with
analyzing pricing plans for bundles of services, and the difficulties in obtaining accurate and
suitable cost data.”).
52. Id. at para. 155.
53. Id. at paras. 86–103. There are some who like to point to the OECD’s 2009
analysis, which purports to show that the United States had among the highest mobile rates
in the world, but the OECD’s analysis has been soundly discredited on its technical merits
and
should
be
given
no
probative
value.
George
S.
Ford,
Be Careful What You Ask for: A Comment on the OECD’s Mobile Price Metrics, PHOENIX
CENTER
PERSPECTIVES,
Sept.
16,
2009,
http://www.phoenixcenter.org/perspectives/Perspective09-03Final.pdf.
54. Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at para. 190.
55. Id. at para. 192.
56. Id. at para. 104; see id. at paras. 104–52.
57. Of course, the mere mention of a rising HHI led some to conclude there was a
competitive problem. For example, in the approving statement of FCC Commissioner
Michael Copps to the Fourteenth CMRS Report, the Commissioner opined that
the Report confirms something I have been warning about for years—that
competition has been dramatically eroded and is seriously endangered by
continuing consolidation and concentration in our wireless markets. One number
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Nonetheless, the FCC’s enlightened economic analysis of
concentration and performance is inconsistently applied. In its recent
Phoenix Forbearance Order, for example, the FCC directly links
concentration to market power in the most stringent of manners.58 Even in
the mobile sector, the FCC appears often to be of two minds. Despite
providing significant evidence of good market performance in the
Fourteenth CMRS Report and rejecting market shares as a per se indicator
of market power, the FCC recently revealed its interest in spectrum
limitations by promulgating a rule limiting access to secondary-market
spectrum by the largest mobile carriers—a de facto spectrum cap—in its
Harbinger decision.59
There, Harbinger Capital Partners sought to acquire Mobile Satellite
Service (“MSS”) provider SkyTerra.60 Although the respective chiefs of the
International Bureau, the Wireless Bureau, and the Office of Engineering
and Technology raised serious concerns about the merged entity’s potential
dominance of the MSS market (including a finding that Harbinger had
ownership positions in MSS competitor TerreStar, along with a variety of
sticks out like a sore thumb: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index—a widelyrecognized and highly-credible measurement of industry concentration—shows
that the concentration of mobile wireless service providers has skyrocketed to a
weighted average of 2848.
Id. at 11703. Commissioner Copps ignores the fact that the Report explicitly rejects this
direct linkage between concentration and competition (“market concentration, by itself, is an
imperfect indicator of market power”) and its conclusions regarding good market
performance. Id. at para. 55. The media also focused on the industry concentration statistics.
See, e.g., Todd Shields, FCC Says Wireless Concentration Rises; AT&T Disagrees,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 20, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-0520/fcc-says-wireless-concentration-rises-at-t-disagrees-update1-.html; Tracy Ford, FCC
Finds Wireless Sector “Concentrated,” RCR WIRELESS (May 20, 2010),
http://www.rcrwireless.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100520/FCC_WIRELESS_REG
ULATIONS/100529993/fcc-finds-wireless-sector-.
58. Petition of Qwest Corp. for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Phx.,
Ariz. Metro. Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 8622 (2010)
(the FCC drew conclusions of market power based primarily on market share). For a critical
review of the FCC’s approach, see George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Impossible
Dream: Forbearance After the Phoenix Order, PHOENIX CENTER PERSPECTIVES, Dec. 16,
2010, http://www.phoenix-center.org/perspectives/Perspective10-08Final.pdf.
59. Schizophrenia is not limited to the present FCC. Despite declaring the mobile
market effectively competitive in 2006, the FCC, under the leadership of Kevin Martin,
imposed open platform mandates to the C-Block of the 700 MHz auction. Compare
Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Eleventh Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 10947 (2006) (declaring the market effectively competitive),
with Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, Second Report and
Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 15289, paras. 189–230 (2007) (imposing open platform mandates).
60. SkyTerra Comm., Inc. & Harbinger Capital Partners Funds, Applications for
Consent to Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Declaratory Ruling,
25 F.C.C.R. 3059 (2010) [hereinafter Harbinger Order].
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other wireless competitors), what tipped the bureau chiefs’ hands was their
acceptance of the merged entity’s promise to build a “4G” terrestrial (as
opposed to satellite) wireless network that will provide coverage in the
United States to at least 100 million people by December 31, 2012, at least
145 million people by December 31, 2013, and at least 260 million people
by December 31, 2015.61 While one can certainly see the appeal of
Harbinger’s offer, the bureau chiefs went one step further by adopting a de
facto spectrum cap without an opportunity for public notice and
comment.62
In particular, Harbinger first promised that, should it “seek to make
spectrum available to either of the two largest terrestrial providers of
CMRS and broadband services,”63 the merged entity would need to obtain
FCC approval.64 Second, the merged entity would be required to live up to
the buildout schedule proposed in the order.65 Finally, the merged entity
would first obtain FCC approval before allowing traffic to the two largest
terrestrial providers’ accounts to amount to more than twenty-five percent
of SkyTerra’s total traffic on its terrestrial network in any Economic
Area.66 These “voluntary commitments” have no apparent connection to
any specific anticompetitive harm revealed by the bureau chiefs’
competitive analysis. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret this de facto
“spectrum cap”67 as revealing a renewed interest in using regulation to
modify market structure in mobile communications by limiting access to
spectrum resources by some or all incumbent firms. For this reason (among
others), we believe our analysis is timely and potentially helpful in the
formulation of spectrum policy.
61. Id. at para. 56.
62. Indeed, contrary to this Administration’s promise of “transparency”—although the
ex parte filings containing voluntary commitments were made on March 26, 2010—the FCC
did not post these ex parte filings on EDOCS until March 29—three days after the order
was released on delegated authority. See Letter from Henry Goldberg, Attorney, Goldberg,
Godles, Wiener & Wright, to Marlene H. Dortch, FCC Secretary, Applications of Harbinger
Capital Partners Funds and SkyTerra Communications, Inc. for Consent to Transfer Control
of Licenses and Authorizations, FCC IB Docket No. 08-184 (rel. Mar. 29, 2010),
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020397552. Thus, it was impossible by
administrative fiat for the public to have an opportunity to comment on Harbinger’s
“voluntary commitment” to a de facto spectrum cap.
63. Harbinger Order, supra note 60, at para. 72.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. The Harbinger Order is plainly a backdoor attempt to regulate indirectly by
adjudication rather than by industry-wide rulemakings. See, e.g., Thomas M. Koutsky &
Lawrence J. Spiwak, Separating Politics from Policy in FCC Merger Reviews: A Basic
Legal Primer of the “Public Interest” Standard, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 329 (2010).
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III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Economic theory, and antitrust policy in general, are firmly and
rightly geared toward encouraging entry by new firms in most situations.
Although economics has identified a number of cases in which entry may
not be socially optimal (e.g., cases of extreme scale economies or “natural
monopoly”), there is a recognizable bias towards encouraging entry in most
68
discussions of public policy. This pro-entry orientation is easily discerned
in any examination of the history of U.S. telecommunications regulation,
with leading examples including the unbundling regulations of the 1996
Telecommunications Act, rules against discriminatory pricing and
mandates for interconnection, and auction rules intended to increase the
likelihood of spectrum license awards to new entrants.
Although this bias towards entry is understandable, it is important to
recognize that economic theory also has established that the social benefits
of entry, while potentially very large in the cases of monopoly and highly
concentrated markets, can diminish fairly rapidly as more firms enter.69
This “drop-off” in the impact of entry depends, of course, on the nature of
market competition, the costs of entry, and the probable alternative path
competition would take should entry not occur. For example, the model
exhibiting the greatest effect of entry is surely the Bertrand duopoly with
identical firms and products, in which the entry of a single additional firm
converts industry performance from monopolistic to perfectly
competitive.70 In this framework, entry by any additional firms has no
social return. At the other end of the spectrum, a cartelized industry that
adopted an entrant into its collusive structure would exhibit no social
benefit from entry, regardless of the number of entrants considered. In
more realistic intermediate cases, of course, entry will reduce prices,
although at a diminishing rate as entry proceeds. The Cournot model of
competition is the standard for intermediate cases, and the logic of this
model lies at the heart of most public policy arguments favoring entry.

68. There are limitations on the number of firms that can serve a market. This economic
reality does not disqualify the entry-preference, but merely tempers it. See Competition After
Unbundling, supra note 22.
69. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 218–21 (1988);
John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Effect of Market Share Distribution on Industry Performance, 61
REV. ECON. & STAT. 101 (1979); Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22.
70. Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22, at 346–47.
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Figure 1. Price and the Number of Firms
Price
pM

Collusion

Cournot
Bertrand

c

1

2

3

4

N = (1/HHI)

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the number of firms and
prices under alternative assumptions about the nature of competition.71 In
the figure, price is measured on the vertical axis and the number of firms N
(or 1/HHI) is measured on the horizontal axis.72 The monopoly price is
labeled pM and marginal cost is labeled c. First, consider the relationship
between the number of firms and price under Cournot competition. As
shown by the line labeled “Cournot,” as the number of firms increases, the
price gradually falls toward marginal cost (that is, the perfectly competitive
outcome). Note that while price continually falls with increases in N under
Cournot competition, most of the price cuts from competition are realized
with the first few firms. In contrast to this steady decline in prices under
Cournot competition, with Bertrand competition, marginal cost pricing is
obtained with only two firms (i.e., duopoly).73 The line labeled “Bertrand”
71. The figure was adapted from John Sutton. SUTTON, supra note 29, at 34.
72. If firms are identical, then HHI = 1/N. If there are two equally sized firms, then the
market shares are fifty percent and the HHI is 0.50. With three firms, the shares are thirtythree percent and the HHI is 0.33.
73. This intense competition creates an interesting predication called the Bertrand
Paradox. If there are fixed costs, then the marginal cost pricing outcome with two firms
ensures both firms earn negative profits. Thus, entry does not occur. Put simply, competition
is so intense that it never happens. The Bertrand Paradox is highly relevant for public policy
analysis in telecommunications markets, and we have incorporated the idea in earlier works,
including Jerry B. Duvall & George S. Ford, Changing Industry Structure: The Economics
of Entry and Price Competition, PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER NO. 10, Apr. 2001,
http://www.phoenix-center.org/pcpp/PCPP10Final.pdf, reprinted in 7 TELECOMM. & SPACE
L.J. 11 (2001); Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22; George S. Ford et al., Network
Neutrality and Industry Structure, PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER NO. 24, Apr. 2006,
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reveals this sharp decline in price from pM to c between the first and second
firm. As just mentioned, after the second entrant, additional firms have no
effect on price, so the HHI and other measures of concentration are
meaningless in the Bertrand framework. Finally, there is a line labeled
“Collusion.” If firms are able to collude perfectly, then the price is held at
the monopoly price regardless of the number of firms. As with Bertrand,
the number of firms tells us almost nothing about price. Clearly, it is
Cournot Competition that is consistent with the common view that more
firms implies “more competition” in the form of lower prices. The failure
to see prices rise as concentration rises in the mobile sector (see Figure 2),
however, suggests that price competition may actually be more intense than
Cournot Competition.74
Thus, in any particular circumstance, it is vital to evaluate the likely
effects of entry in light of both the observed industry structure and the
probable alternative path competition could take if some form of entry were
prohibited. These considerations are particularly relevant to the evaluation
of the FCC policy of the “spectrum cap” (or favoritism in the auction
rules), which is, in effect, a prohibition on entry by a class of credible
incumbents. If one assumes, as seems correct, that the FCC policy is
effective in the sense that it changes the outcome of the spectrum auction
by altering which firm (or firms) obtain the desired spectrum license, then
it is necessary to evaluate the outcome that the policy produces in
comparison with the outcome obtained in the absence of the policy. Thus,
if the practical effect of an incumbent-exclusion rule is to keep some firm,
Firm 1 say, from obtaining the spectrum, then one needs to examine both
what Firm 1 would have done with it, had it been allowed to win, and what
the ultimate winner will do with it. It would then be possible to compare
the welfare consequences of these two cases and make a credible judgment
on the social welfare consequences of the prohibition.
The welfare comparison described above is not simple, but a simple
model can form the conceptual basis for the comparison. This is our
purpose in this section. We begin by noting that, looked at broadly, an
incumbent-exclusion policy (such as spectrum caps), if it makes sense, is
actually a prohibition on entry imposed on a subset of firms that already
http://www.phoenix-center.org/pcpp/PCPP24Final.pdf, reprinted as T. Randolph Beard et
al., Network Neutrality and Industry Structure, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 149 (2007).
74. Some economic models allow the intensity of competition to vary continuously
from Bertrand to Perfect Collusion. See, e.g., MICHAEL WATERSON, ECONOMIC THEORY OF
THE INDUSTRY 17–36 (1984); MARTIN, supra note 14, at 13–45. The effects of the intensity
of competition on market structure is detailed in Competition After Unbundling, supra note
22.
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own related assets. Further, for the policy to make any difference, it is
necessary that these prohibited firms be likely actually to win the spectrum
in the absence of the policy, or else the policy is meaningless. The
relevance of the policy, in turn, suggests that the analyst should assume that
the profits available to the prohibited firm from acquiring the spectrum
must exceed those a favored entrant could obtain, or else the banned entrant
would not win the auction anyway. Thus, for the incumbent-exclusion
policy to make sense from the social perspective, it must be that entry by
the favored entrant creates welfare gains—for example, by lowering market
prices, which are sufficient to overcome the fact that the banned entrant
(e.g., an incumbent) values the spectrum asset more than anyone else.
This logic appears to underlie the FCC’s spectrum cap policy and
other regulatory handicaps placed on incumbent firms. In other words, by
prohibiting a large incumbent from winning the spectrum at auction, the
FCC expects another firm to use the spectrum to support entry into wireless
voice communications and related services, thus increasing competition in
these markets.
What use, though, should one assume the unwelcome bidder would
make of the spectrum had it been allowed to buy the spectrum? Here, some
speculation is necessary, yet it appears highly likely that this asset would
not be used merely to provide greater quantities of the same voice
communication products currently offered by the firm over other
frequencies. Rather, discussions in the business press and elsewhere75 point
to the introduction of broadband/information-type services, which are
regarded as complements to existing wireless voice-grade products, and
would probably be sold together with them in packages.76
In contrast to this “complementary entry,” if the incumbent-exclusion
rule effectively caused a “new” entrant to join existing wireless firms in
offering a standard product in competition to the offerings of the
incumbents, then one would expect to see the equilibrium price of this
standard offering fall in response to competitive entry. As outlined earlier,
though, the extent of this price reduction would depend on the current
75. See, e.g., NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at ch. 5; Nicholas
Kolakowski, CTIA Keynotes Focus on Spectrum Crunch, Broadband Future, EWEEK.COM
(Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Mobile-and-Wireless/CTIA-Keynotes-Focuson-Spectrum-Crunch-Broadband-Future-533219/; Stacey Higginbotham, Mobile Milestone:
(Mar.
24,
2010),
Data
Surpasses
Voice
Traffic,
GIGAOM
http://gigaom.com/2010/03/24/mobile-milestone-data-surpasses-voice-traffic/.
76. In the United States, mobile broadband services are typically sold with mobile voice
services. See, e.g., AT&T, www.att.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2011); VERIZON WIRELESS,
http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/index.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2011); Welcome to
Sprint, SPRINT, www.sprint.com/index_p.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2011).
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market structure and the nature of competition in the market—for example,
Cournot or Bertrand competition. In the past, the prevalent structure in
many mobile markets in the United States was a duopoly, but that has of
course changed substantially in recent years, and most customers now
enjoy multiple vendor options for these services.77

A.

Theoretical Model

In order to make our analysis both general and simple, we proceed as
follows. First, the standard voice market can be described as a Cournot
oligopoly, with n firms selling identical products at identical marginal
costs, which we normalize to zero. We identify Firm 1 as the seller
prohibited by the auction rules from acquiring a newly available spectrum
asset (which we term an incumbent-exclusion rule). In the absence of the
incumbent-exclusion rule, Firm 1 would win the bid for the spectrum, and
would use it to offer a complementary good that would benefit its voice
service customers, conveying a competitive advantage. In the interest of
simplicity and to render conservative results, we assume that Firm 1 can
make no profits whatsoever from the sale of this complementary good
except through the effects of its sale on the demand for its voice product.
All consumer surplus and seller profits from this complementary good are
ignored, so that our analysis will not be biased towards any finding that the
incumbent-exclusion rule is socially wasteful.78 In our analysis, Firm 1
would win the bidding for the spectrum asset in the absence of the rule, and
would use the spectrum differently than the bidder winning the asset under
the exclusion rule. Further, the firm winning the asset under the incumbentexclusion rule will dutifully enter the voice services market, increasing
competition and reducing prices.
Suppose first that there was no incumbent-exclusion rule. In that case,
let the prices earned by the firms be given by the simple price equations:

P1

(a  ' )  Q,

(1)

Pi

a Q

(2)

for i = 2, 3, … n

77. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, First Report, 10 F.C.C.R. 8844, para. 4 (1995).
78. If one took into account the surpluses potentially rising from the complementary
good, then the spectrum cap would not only prohibit incumbent purchase of the spectrum,
but would also prohibit the introduction of a “new” product. Under our assumptions, this
new product may be introduced by anyone, but since it is not profitable by itself, only a firm
with existing voice services would introduce it. Thus, in order to capture this effect without
biasing the findings, we assume no direct profits from the sale of the complement.
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where Q = q1 + q2 + . . . + qn and where a and  are positive known
constants. Here the parameter a represents market size and  represents the
additional value created for customers of Firm 1 due to creation of the
complementary product.79 We note also that, under the incumbentexclusion rule, Equations (1) and (2) continue to describe the market if one
takes  = 0, and lets n rise to n + 1. Recall that all prices are net of
marginal costs.
In the absence of the exclusion rule, we assume a Noncooperative
Nash Equilibrium in quantities of the usual Cournot sort. First order
conditions for this solution are:
a  '  Q  q1

0

(3)

for Firm 1 and
a  Q  qi

0

for i = 2, 3, . . . n.

(4)

Under symmetry for firms 2, 3, . . . n, the solutions are:
qi

( a  ' ) /( n  1)

q1

( a  n' ) /( n  1)

for i = 2, 3, . . . n,

(5)
(6)

which satisfy the second order conditions and are unique so long as  < a.
Calculating market output in the equilibrium, we obtain:

Q

n
1
a
',
n 1
n 1

(7)

so that market output Q is increasing in . This result implies that the
common price for Firms 2 through n, denoted Pi, falls as  increases. Thus,
the introduction of the competitive advantage to Firm 1 causes its rivals’
prices to fall, in the same way that a decrease in the costs of a given firm
will cause other firms to price more competitively in response. As for P1,
the advantage  causes P1 to rise, but less than the increase in consumer
value created by the complementary good. Since P1 = Pi + , the
equilibrium response is:

79. The value a shifts the market demand curve, whereas  is a shift in demand only for
Firm 1.
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(8)

Given these responses, it is clear that the social welfare consequences of
the incumbent-exclusion rule will depend on a comparison of the benefits
of the complementary good and resulting competitive effects, versus the
benefits of increased competition through conventional entry into the
standard good market.
In our assessment of the welfare effects of an exclusion rule, we start
by “stacking the deck” against the finding that the incumbent-exclusion
rule is bad policy by focusing on consumer welfare only. This biases the
analysis because firms are always harmed with entry in a Cournot
framework. To begin, we ignore this effect on firms, thus inflating the
welfare consequences of an incumbent-exclusion rule. The simple linear
form of demands and normalized marginal costs imply that consumer
surplus with entry by Firm 1 with the complementary good is just:

CW ( n, ' )

1 2
Q .
2

(9)

Similarly, with the incumbent-exclusion rule, consumer surplus can be
suggestively written as CW(n + 1, 0), and simple algebra establishes that
CW(n, ) > CW(n + 1, 0) if and only if:

'
1
!
.
a n2

(10)

Condition (10) is elegant and highly suggestive: as an approximation, the
incumbent-exclusion rule actually reduces consumer welfare, ignoring any
benefits or costs to firms and benefits from the complementary market
itself, whenever the effect of the complement on the value of the standard
good, as a percentage of willingness to pay for the standard good, exceeds
the statistic 1/(n + 2). Put another way, it is clear that society would prefer
introduction of the complementary good over further entry into the
standard good market when either (1) the complement is sufficiently valuecreating (a large ), or (2) the existing market is already sufficiently
competitive (a large n, or intense rivalry).

B.

Illustrations of the Theory

Simple graphs are sufficient to illustrate the basic logic of these
findings in both the consumer-only and consumer-plus-producer surplus
cases. Consider Figure 2 below. Here, we normalize a to be equal to 1, so
that one can view the vertical axis representation of . The shaded region
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above the curve illustrates the set of parameter values for which consumers
would be better served by abandoning the entry prohibitions embodied in
the incumbent-exclusion rule. The curve has negative slope because the
value created by the complementary good in the standard market need not
be as large when the standard good market is sufficiently competitive to
begin with. The logic is important. The larger the number of firms in the
market (that is, the more competitive the existing market), the more likely
an incumbent-exclusion rule is bad policy. So, while the spectrum caps (a
form of an incumbent-exclusion rule) that applied early in the evolution of
mobile services may have made sense given the duopoly structure of the
market, in the present environment, when nearly every consumer has a
choice among four providers,80 the incumbent-exclusion rule is not as
easily supportable on welfare grounds. Further, historically, the potential
for important innovative services was much lower than today, given the
evolution of wireless broadband services.

Similarly, Figure 3 provides the same analysis when total social
welfare is used (consumer-plus-producer surplus). Note that we have
significantly rescaled the vertical axis. As explained above, including both
consumer and producer surplus greatly tilts the analysis towards a finding
of welfare harm from the incumbent-exclusion rule as modeled here, but
only because the consumer welfare standard alone is biased. This
difference arises because in Cournot competition (and all “intermediate”
models of competition), entry reduces prices, albeit at a decreasing rate.
80. Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at para. 44.
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Low prices reduce aggregate firm profits (i.e., a component of producer
surplus). By forcing entry to take a form that reduces the profits of all
incumbent firms, the incumbent-exclusion policy is unlikely to increase
social welfare unless it provides very significant benefits to consumers
through the competition-price reduction effect. However, that effect is not
very large in Cournot and similar models beyond a few firms.

These figures highlight several features of the incumbent-exclusion
policy debate, which have been given too little weight in previous
discussions—perhaps because concentration was much higher historically
and no services were contemplated other than voice service. As is always
the case, the social value of a policy cannot be determined unless one
compares the likely outcomes with and without the policy. Given the
present high levels of competition in the domestic mobile market, it is
unlikely that additional entry will lead to substantial competitive price
effects. The CRMS Reports and the FCC merger approvals consistently
indicate that the FCC believes there is no meaningful relationship between
concentration and market performance under current market conditions.81
The price gains from more entry, then, are expected to be small or absent
altogether. Alternately, the benefits of expanding spectrum assets for the
purpose of providing broadband services are presumed to be high. The
policy bias, it seems, should be in favor of more spectrum in the hands of
81. In some instances, divestitures of spectrum assets are required in mergers and
acquisitions. Such regulation actions are specifically intended to alleviate market power
concerns. See Chloe Albanesius, DOJ Approves Verizon-Alltel, but with Big Caveats,
PCMAG.COM (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2333728,00.asp.
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existing firms. Further evidence in this regard is provided in the next
section.

IV. “MORE” SPECTRUM DOES NOT A FORTIORI MEAN “MORE”
FIRMS
The notion that more spectrum leads to more firms, or that
incumbent-exclusion rules lead to more firms, is based on the presumption
that the only factor limiting the number of firms is the amount of or access
to spectrum resources. This view ignores the substantial capital investments
and expenses required to build, maintain, and operate a mobile network.
Moreover, it ignores the complexities and realities of managing a large
customer base, and the interdependencies in demand and cost across the
range of products offered over such networks. Put simply, dividing a chunk
of spectrum into ten pieces does not imply that ten firms are financially
viable. It is the supply- and demand-side conditions of the market, of which
spectrum resources are but a part, that determine the equilibrium number of
firms.82 In the above analysis, we assumed that the spectrum leads to
greater numbers of financially viable firms, so as to give the incumbentexclusion policy the most favorable theoretical treatment. Economics and
history, however, suggest otherwise.

A.

Theoretical Evidence

The prior analysis looks at the tradeoff between additional entrybased competition and the utility derived from the creation of a
complementary good. This analysis assumed that entry and exit into the
standard market was costless. In reality, there are likely to be substantial
fixed costs associated with entry by a new firm into the
telecommunications marketplace. The presence of fixed costs allows a
long-run characterization of the number of firms likely to be present in the
market. Entry and exit are assumed to occur until economic profits are
driven to zero.
The profit level of a firm producing the standard good will be a
comparison of its net revenue (net price times quantity) and the level of
fixed costs. We will denote the fixed costs by the symbol F. Combining
equations (7) and (2) yields the (net) price level of the standard good and
equation (5) provides a characterization of the quantity. Setting the profit
level of the standard good equal to zero will provide a characterization of
the long-run number of firms present in the standard market. The number
82. Competition After Unbundling, supra note 22, at 335, 341–59; First Report, supra
note 23, at paras. 377–83.
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of long-run firms, nLR, will solve the following equation:
2

ª a' º
» F
«
¬ n LR  1 ¼

0

(11)

If the number of firms is treated as a continuous variable, then the impact
of the sale of new spectrum on one of the existing firms (for the creation of
a complementary good) can be characterized by:
d nLR
d'

1
F

(12)

The long-run loss to competition in the standard market could
therefore be quite low if there are relatively large fixed costs associated
with entry into the standard market. (In reality, the fixed costs are very
large, limiting the number of successful firms to a small number.83)
Furthermore, the loss of competition might even be zero due to the fact that
the number of firms is, in reality, a discrete value. The amount of new
spectrum may be insufficient to actually support an additional firm in the
standard marketplace due to the fixed costs. In such a case, making the new
spectrum available to an existing firm would generate welfare gain via the
development of a complement without any long-run loss of competition in
the standard market. In other words, there may not be a tradeoff between
more quality or more firms, since the number of firms that can viably serve
the market may be insensitive to spectrum policy due to the underlying
supply- and demand-side economic conditions of the market.

B.

The Historical Evidence

Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the market shares of the
largest mobile telephony firms and the total MHz of spectrum made
available by the FCC to such firms over the period from 1993 through
2009. Total spectrum is shown by the shaded area in the figure and is rising
over the entire time period. In 1993, there was 50 MHz of spectrum used
for mobile telephony. Including all auctioned spectrum, this number rose to
361 MHz by 2009.84

83. See Fourteenth CMRS Report, supra note 17, at para. 61.
84. Auction data is available at FCC Auctions Data, FED. COMM. COMM’N,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auctions_data (last visited Apr. 16, 2011).
There are other calculations of available spectrum for commercial uses, but the sum of
auctioned spectrum presented here is a sensible and unbiased one.
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Figure 4. MHz of Spectrum and Industry Concentration
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The Concentration Ratio, CRn, is used to measure industry
concentration. The Concentration Ratio is computed as the sum of the n
largest firms in the market. That is, CR2 measures the summed market
shares of the two largest firms, and CR5 measures the market share of the
five largest firms. Both the CR2 and the CR5 are illustrated in the above
figure.85 Finally, the average revenue per minute for mobile telephony is
provided. All data are computed at the national level.
The figure shows clearly the following. First, the amount of spectrum
has risen, yet industry concentration—as measured by the concentration
ratio—has not declined. Thus, historical evidence does not support the
notion that more spectrum means a lower level of industry concentration.
Second, while concentration has risen over this interval, the price of mobile
telephony has fallen consistently over the period.86 Therefore, historical
evidence also does not support the notion that higher concentration leads to
higher prices. The latter result has important implications for the theory. If
85. The data is compiled from the FCC’s CMRS Reports (various years), which are
available at Commercial Mobile Radio Services (CMRS) Competition Reports, FED. COMM.
COMM’N, http://wireless.fcc.gov/index.htm?job=cmrs_reports (last visited Apr. 16, 2011).
86. Average revenue per minute data is compiled from the FCC’s CMRS Reports
(various years). See id. The data are adjusted by the Consumer Price Index.
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changes in concentration (or the number of firms) do not impact market
performance, then the gains from an incumbent-exclusion rule are likely to
be small and the net losses large.
We note that these data cover many years, and technology has
evolved over the years. As such, the trends in the figure are merely
suggestive. Nevertheless, the historical data cannot be ignored and, if
considered, it provides important insights for the economic value of
incumbent-exclusion policies.

V. CONCLUSIONS
With the National Broadband Plan’s promise of 500 additional MHz
of spectrum for commercial purposes, the question of how to allocate those
resources among competing uses and users will dominate the
communications policy debate over the coming years. The value of that
spectrum depends critically on allocation choices. In this Article, we
provide a policy-relevant, economically motivated framework to aid in
such decisions, with a focus on incumbent-exclusion rules—including but
not limited to formal spectrum caps. The analysis focuses on the efficacy of
exclusion rules (or similar regulations limiting access by existing firms to
new spectrum) for promoting economic welfare and maximizing the value
of spectrum resources. At a basic level, the analysis describes the tradeoffs
between dividing a fixed amount of spectrum into either many small pieces
or a few big pieces. Since advanced services, such as mobile broadband,
demand that each firm possess large amounts of spectrum, the relevant
tradeoff is potentially between many firms selling less advanced services
versus few firms selling more advanced services.
Our analysis highlights several key components of the spectrum
allocation decision. First, an incumbent-exclusion rule is not “pro-entry,”
but instead seeks to select one form of entry (many low quality) over
another (few high quality). Given the nature of the rule, the social value of
an incumbent-exclusion rule cannot be determined unless one compares the
likely outcomes with and without the policy, recognizing that the types of
entry may vary across regimes. Second, given the existing level of
competition in the domestic mobile market, the potential for sizeable
competitive price effects is low. Third, given the high social value of
broadband and the potential for mobile broadband to substitute for fixedline services, the economic benefits of advanced wireless services is likely
to be very high. Fourth, access to spectrum resources does not necessarily
convey financial success. Actual financial performance in the mobile sector
suggests that the market is leaning to fewer rather than more competitors,
so efforts to force more entry through spectrum policy are likely to fail,
leaving scarce spectrum resources fallow. While more competition is
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always enticing and public policy often plays a role in promoting
competition, the FCC must be realistic in its expectations.
The policy tradeoffs described here are theoretical and valid
regardless of one’s predilections about spectrum policy. As we discuss,
resolving the inherent ambiguity between more of one thing and less of
another must turn on the evidence. We see it one way. Whether one adheres
to our particular interpretation of the facts has no bearing on the usefulness
of the theoretical framework presented here, however, and we hope it is
helpful.

